Academic Paper attributes
Recent academic research has extensively examined algorithmic collusion resulting from the utilization of artificial intelligence (AI)-based dynamic pricing algorithms. Nevertheless, e-commerce platforms employ recommendation algorithms to allocate exposure to various products, and this important aspect has been largely overlooked in previous studies on algorithmic collusion. Our study bridges this important gap in the literature and examines how recommendation algorithms can determine the competitive or collusive dynamics of AI-based pricing algorithms. Specifically, two commonly deployed recommendation algorithms are examined: (i) a recommender system that aims to maximize the sellers total profit (profit-based recommender system) and (ii) a recommender system that aims to maximize the demand for products sold on the platform (demand-based recommender system). We construct a repeated game framework that incorporates both pricing algorithms adopted by sellers and the platforms recommender system. Subsequently, we conduct experiments to observe price dynamics and ascertain the final equilibrium. Experimental results reveal that a profit-based recommender system intensifies algorithmic collusion among sellers due to its congruence with sellers profit-maximizing objectives. Conversely, a demand-based recommender system fosters price competition among sellers and results in a lower price, owing to its misalignment with sellers goals. Extended analyses suggest the robustness of our findings in various market scenarios. Overall, we highlight the importance of platforms recommender systems in delineating the competitive structure of the digital marketplace, providing important insights for market participants and corresponding policymakers.
